Ali Danial Hemani, a dual U.S.–Pakistan citizen living in Texas, became the subject of a federal investigation in 2022 after authorities suspected him and his family of terrorism-related activity. During a search of the family home, Hemani cooperated with law enforcement. He turned over a firearm he kept in the house, pointed agents to marijuana on the property, and agreed to an interview in which he acknowledged using marijuana “about every other day.” More than six months later — without pursuing any terrorism-related charges — the government brought a single-count indictment against Hemani for violating 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3), which bars unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms.
The charge did not allege drug trafficking, addiction, or any violent conduct. Instead, it rested solely on Hemani’s admitted marijuana use and his possession of a firearm in his home. The government did not contend that his drug use had ever made him dangerous, nor that he had misused a weapon. Hemani moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that applying §922(g)(3) to him violated the Second Amendment.
The district court agreed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to review the decision of the lower court. The Court framed the question as whether the government’s application of §922(g)(3), which, as construed, automatically disarms anyone who is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance, is consistent with the Second Amendment. Applying the analytical framework set out in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, the Court first found that the statute burdens conduct covered by the Second Amendment, because it bars a class of individuals from possessing firearms for any purpose. That triggered the government’s burden to show that the restriction is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
The government argued that §922(g)(3) is analogous to historical laws targeting “habitual drunkards.” It identified three types of such laws: vagrancy statutes that permitted confinement in workhouses or jail; civil-commitment regimes that allowed courts to appoint guardians or commit individuals to asylums; and surety laws requiring certain individuals to post bonds for good behavior. According to the government, these laws demonstrate a longstanding tradition of restricting the liberties of individuals who regularly used intoxicants, in order to protect the public from dangerous behavior.
The Court rejected that analogy on multiple grounds. First, it found that the historical laws targeted a different group of people. At the founding and in the early Republic, a “habitual drunkard” was not simply someone who regularly consumed alcohol, but someone whose drinking rendered him “incapable of conducting his affairs,” “mentally incompetent,” or lacking self-control. By contrast, §922(g)(3), as interpreted by the government, applies to anyone who regularly uses any controlled substance in any amount for non-prescribed purposes — without requiring proof of incapacity, impairment, or dangerousness.
Second, the Court found that the purposes of the historical laws differed from those of §922(g)(3). Vagrancy laws were aimed at enforcing work norms and addressing social disorder; civil-commitment statutes sought to protect individuals and their families from self-inflicted harm; and surety laws often focused on preventing moral or social “scandals,” not violence. The Court concluded that these laws were not primarily designed to disarm a class of individuals deemed categorically dangerous in the way the government claimed for §922(g)(3).
Third, the Court emphasized differences in how the laws operated. The historical regimes typically required some form of process before restricting an individual’s liberty, such as a conviction, a court proceeding, or a judicial finding. By contrast, §922(g)(3), as applied by the government, automatically strips individuals of the right to possess firearms based solely on their status as unlawful users, without any prior hearing or individualized determination.
The Court also questioned whether §922(g)(3) is in fact tailored to the government’s asserted goal of disarming dangerous individuals. Because the statute incorporates the Controlled Substances Act, it applies broadly to substances regulated for varied reasons, not all related to violence. The Court pointed to the federal government’s own evolving treatment of marijuana — including reduced enforcement and changes in scheduling — as undercutting the claim that all regular users are categorically dangerous. Accepting the government’s position, the Court cautioned, would grant it “broad power to designate any group as dangerous and thereby disqualify its members from having a gun.”
Taken together, these differences led the Court to conclude that the government failed to establish that §922(g)(3), as applied to Hemani, is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the indictment.
The Court emphasized the limited scope of its holding. It did not address the constitutionality of disarming individuals who are presently intoxicated, those who are addicted, or those shown through individualized evidence to pose a danger. Nor did it address other provisions of §922(g), including those disarming felons or individuals adjudicated as mentally ill.
The decision further undermines existing limits on broad, status-based firearm prohibitions that do not account for actual impairment or risk. The Court’s analysis focuses on the absence of individualized evidence that a person’s substance use affects judgment, reliability, or public safety. At the same time, the opinion preserves room for more targeted restrictions, including those based on demonstrated dangerousness, present impairment, or formal adjudication.
While the ruling does not address employment standards directly — and leaves intact the government’s ability to regulate firearms based on individualized findings — it signals tension between categorical exclusions based solely on drug use and standards that require a demonstrated connection to job fitness or risk. As a result, officers who have found themselves disqualified or removed from service based strictly on status as a marijuana user, particularly in jurisdictions where use is lawful under state law, may look to whether those determinations rested on individualized assessments or on the same type of broad, status-based approach the Court rejected here.
United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2559 (U.S. June 18, 2026).
This article appears in the August 2026 issue of our monthly newsletter, Public Safety Labor News.
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